一、主讲人：叶冬艳，清华大学经济管理公司博士、硕士和学士。2007-2008年在麻省理工公司斯隆管理公司访问交流，2009年后在长江商公司做研究学者，2012-2013年美国哥伦比亚大学访问交流，2013-2014年在加州大学圣地亚哥分校访问交流。主要研究领域为资产定价和市场微观结构。

二、主题：Disclosure, Learning, and Coordination

We analyze how informed investors can learn from each other through disclosed trades. We show that disclosure always increases market efficiency but its effect on informed investors' profits is ambiguous. When informed investors have highly complementary signals, disclosure makes them coordinate their trades, so their expected profits are higher. Moreover, an informed investor with very imprecise information would prefer competition in the presence of disclosure as he learns more from the other informed investor than the market maker and makes more profits than he would obtain if he is the only informed investor in the market. As a result, when information acquisition is costly and endogenous, there could exist herding in information acquisition.

三、时间：2015年1月21日，星期三上午，10:00-11:00

四、地点：304am永利集团公司南路校区主教学楼913会议室